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Abstract
Law enforcement agencies around the world use ridge-based biometrics, especially fingerprints, to fight crime.
Fingermarks that are left at a crime scene and identified as potentially having evidential value (EV) in a court of law are
recorded for further forensic analysis. Here, we test our evidential value algorithm (EVA) which uses image features
trained on forensic expert decisions for 1428 fingermarks to produce an EV score for an image. First, we study the
relationship between whether a fingermark is assessed as having EV, either by a human expert or by EVA, and its
correct and confident identification by an automatic identification system. In particular, how often does an automatic
system achieve identification when the mark is assessed as not having evidential value? We show that when the
marks are captured by a mobile phone, correct and confident automatic matching occurs for 257 of the 1428. Of
these, 236 were marked as having sufficient EV by experts and 242 by EVA thresholded on equal error rate. Second, we
test four relatively challenging ridge-based biometric databases and show that EVA can be successfully applied to
give an EV score to all images. Using EV score as an image quality value, we show that in all databases, thresholding on
EV improves performance in closed set identification. Our results suggest an EVA application that filters fingermarks
meeting a minimum EV score could aid forensic experts at the point of collection, or by flagging difficult latents
objectively, or by pre-filtering specimens before submission to an AFIS.
Keywords: Ballprint, Evidential value, Fingermarks, Identification, Image quality
1 Introduction
Fingermarks or other marks found at crime scenes are
often highly distorted because they are accidentally left
behind, rather than purposely recorded within a specified
environment and under controlled conditions. A mark’s
quality may range from excellent to poor and determines
its further use. Experts evaluate the forensic quality of a
mark (or its digital representation): that is, the quantity of
information available in the mark and the relevance of the
mark at the crime scene. There is no benefit attached to
collecting all marks found at a crime scene and submit-
ting them for further analysis regardless of their forensic
quality. This leads to additional workload for forensic
specialists who use the traditional ACE-V system (rather
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than the likelihood ratio approach [1]) to analyse the low-
quality marks and disregard them afterwards. Hence, it
is desirable to limit the collection to those marks that at
least meet someminimal condition of sufficient evidential
value to be of use in an ongoing police investigation.
Our goal here is to assess whether our evidential value
algorithm (EVA; which estimates a mark’s evidential value
(EV) automatically), introduced in Kotzerke et al. [2], has
the capacity to reduce workload and streamline the cap-
ture process by entrusting non-expert police with mark
selection and collection. We test the performance of EVA
in two ways. First, in the worst case, EVA might score a
mark to be of no evidential value but it nonetheless will
identify its donor in an automatic identification. We test
if there are any marks that can be automatically and with
confidence identified (against a reference database) but
are not of EV according to either EVA or expert assess-
ment. Secondly, we investigate if EVA is sufficiently gen-
eral that its EV score for an image can be used to infer an
image quality value for specimens from several relatively
© The Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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challenging ridge-based biometric databases and, if so,
how this image quality affects a closed set identification.
This article extends and updates the conference paper
[3]. The experimental setup in [3] for the worst case test
has been updated and the experiments repeated. Our
updated results appear in Section 3.1. All the work in
Section 3.2 using EVA to infer an image quality value for
other databases is new, as are the corresponding identifi-
cation experiments.
1.1 Background
Law enforcement agencies rely heavily on fingermarks
to exclude or to identify persons of interest using auto-
matic systems (AFIS) and human fingerprint experts [4].
Fingerprint examiners follow the analysis, comparison,
evaluation, and verification (ACE-V) protocol [5]. During
analysis, they decide if the mark is of value for individual-
isation (VID), value for exclusion only (VEO) or no value
(NV). Those with VID or VEO have evidential value (EV);
those with NV do not.
Fingermarks often suffer from low quality (a small
amount of relevant information present or a low degree
of distinctiveness) due to being smudged or partial, over-
lapped with other marks [6] or distorted by the surface
pattern of the object on which they are found [7]. For
fingerprints captured under controlled conditions, finger-
print quality metrics abound (for a recent review, see Yao
et al. [8]). However, the forensic value of a fingermark is
quite different and is difficult to grasp for non-experts.
Ulery et al. show that accuracy and repeatability vary
even amongst forensic experts and mostly depend on the
print quality [9, 10], especially for borderline decisions.
Consequently, Kellman et al. use image features to pre-
dict “expert performance and subjective assessment of
difficulty in fingerprint comparisons” [11].
Most quality measures are used to prevent low-quality
images from being automatically matched because they
tend to produce false minutiae and consequently false
matches [12]. Therefore, they are suited to operational law
enforcement agency setups and are optimised and tested
for contact scanners [13–16] but not fingermarks. This
has resulted in algorithms tuned to a capture resolution
of 500 ppi. If the input image deviates from the assumed
resolution, the algorithm usually falls short.
On the other hand, fingermarks require robust meth-
ods to estimate their quality because all the above factors
will vary and influence the quality and its estimate. Yoon
et al. demonstrated in [17] that the NIST quality estima-
tor reference implementation NFIQ1 is outdated because
an AFIS was able to return a print’s mate although it was
classified as of lowest quality. They proposed a feature-
based quality measure for latents, LFIQ, which they show
is a good predictor of AFIS decisions. The NIFQ1 replace-
ment NFIQ2 [16] has recently been officially released.
However, it is still primarily developed for fingerprints
captured at a known resolution.
If the capture resolution is unknown, an estimate based
on image features can improve the performance signif-
icantly. For instance, the RLAPS algorithm of Kotzerke
et al. [2] estimates the inter-ridge spacing of a fingerprint
or fingermark image. The power spectrum is computed
and its radial average is determined only around its maxi-
mum peak within a certain frequency range. Assuming an
average inter-ridge spacing of 9 px for an adult leads to a
capture resolution estimate.
Kotzerke et al. [2] include capture resolution estimation
(CRE) as a component of an algorithmwhich computes an
evidential value score of an image based on image features
and trained on expert decisions. We refer to this specific
estimation algorithm as EVA. In [2], it is established that
mobile phone images are suitable for EVA to estimate if
a fingermark has EV and can achieve results close to an
expert assessment, based on the image features.
1.2 Outline
In the following, Section 2, we describe EVA and the
methodology used in the two experiments and detail
the databases tested (three of adult fingerprints and one
of newborn ballprints). In Section 3, we describe our
experiments and report their results. First, we perform
verification experiments using EVA to demonstrate the
interplay between a mark’s correct and confident identifi-
cation (ccID) and if it is of EV according to either experts
or EVA (Section 3.1). This is followed by application of
EVA to the four databases to estimate their specimens’
quality and the role this image quality estimate plays in a
mate retrieval scenario (Section 3.2). In Section 4, we dis-
cuss our results, summarise their implications and point
out directions for future research.
2 Methods
We begin by describing EVA, the ridge-based biometric
evidential value estimation algorithm that we use in this
paper. We introduce the idea of correct and confident
identification (ccID) that is applied in the first experiment.
Then, we present our argument for using the evidential
value score output by EVA as an estimate of image quality,
as we do in our second experiment. Lastly, we detail the
databases we use to test EVA.
2.1 Evidential value algorithm
The ridge-based biometric evidential value estimation
algorithm EVA is introduced in [2] (see Fig. 1). An image is
scaled if necessary using some CRE algorithm to 500 ppi,
and a mask is built using optimal thresholding to remove
background. The CRE options available are none (image
assumed to be 500 ppi), RLAPS and Global (a scaling
factor estimated for the capture device). Then, NFIQ2
Kotzerke et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:24 Page 3 of 10
Fig. 1 [2] Diagram of the evidential value algorithm (EVA). A
fingermark is captured with an imaging device and scaled based on
the capture resolution estimation (CRE) to 500 ppi; image features are
extracted and classified; resulting after thresholding in the binary
decision if this mark is of sufficient evidential value (EV) or not (EV)
and Verifinger features are extracted from the masked
image. NFIQ2 features are as specified in the preliminary
definition guide [16]: that is, Frequency Domain Analysis,
Gabor Segment, Gabor Shen, Gabor, Local Clarity Score,
Mu Mu Block, Mu Mu Sigma Block, Mu Sigma Block,
Mu, Orientation Flow, Orientation Certainty Level, Radial
Power Spectrum, Ridge Valley Uniformity, Sigma Mu
Block and Sigma. Verifinger features, extracted using
Neurotechnology Verifinger 6.7 [18], are its quality value
and the number of minutiae. Their Fusion (concatena-
tion of the NFIQ2 and Verifinger feature vectors) is also
used. Classification algorithms available are support vec-
tor machine (SVM), discriminant analysis (DA) and k-
nearest neighbour (k-NN). After classification, a raw evi-
dential value estimate q ∈[ 0, 1], the EV score, is output
by EVA. If a binary decision is required, q is compared to
a threshold t to conclude if there is sufficient evidential
value (EV) or not (EV).
In [2], the Victoria Police fingermark database TVP and
its ground truth (see Section 2.4.1) is used to train and
optimise EVA and estimate evidential value using these
feature sets and CREs for three capture devices (scan-
ner, DSLR, phone). For instance, the best equal error rates
(EERs) for evidential value from EVA versus ground truth
are obtained for the Fusion feature set and Global CRE
[2, Table 1], using DA for scanner and phone images and
SVM for DSLR.
We use these optimised parameter settings and EV
scores in our experiments.
2.2 Correct and confident identification
Assuming that a fingermark is compared against a refer-
ence database containing N distinct fingerprints, a ver-
ification score Sj is returned for every comparison. We
define a decision as correct and confident (ccID) if and
only if the mark and the print with the highest score Si are
from the same subject (correct) and if the highest score is
larger by factor d > 1 than any other score (confident):
Sj : Si ≤ dSj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, j = i. (1)
This would lead to a correct and confident identifi-
cation. One has to keep in mind that the smaller d is
chosen, the greater the likelihood becomes that a decision
is considered to be confident but is in fact due to low
verification scores derived from poor-quality images.
2.3 Quality implications of evidential value
In real situations, there are often marks or prints with
questionable quality (and hence questionable distinctive-
ness). Those marks are prone to produce false matches.
The matching accuracy and repeatability varies even for
forensic experts and mostly depends on the mark’s quality
[9, 10].
The question is how the identification performance
changes if these low-quality images are removed from
the set. For our second experiment, we use the forensic
experts’ decisions for fingermarks to train a classifier to
classify the quality of images showing ridge-based biomet-
ric features according to their image features.
This approach is based on the assumption that eviden-
tial value and image quality are correlated. This hypothesis
is reasonable because in [2] it is shown that for pseudo fin-
germarks the evidential value can be derived from a set of
image features. Therefore, the contrary argument should
hold true as well and the EV score q should serve as a basic
image quality estimate.
We test four image sets of ridge-based biometrics. Each
image set consists of a reference set R and a test set
T , which do not intersect. All elements of both sets are
pairwise compared against each other using a commer-
cial matcher and a matching score is computed for each
comparison.
We simulate an identification scenario on a closed set
and investigate the rank of the correct mate (∈ R) of the
query print (∈ T). We measure the percentage of query
specimens having their mate found within rank k and how
this percentage changes as we remove images with low
quality q.
2.4 Databases
We employ six different databases. They are the Victo-
ria Police pseudo fingermark database with its ground
truth and its reference database (Section 2.4.1), the IIIT-
D latent fingerprint database and its reference database
(Section 2.4.2), an imposter database based on various
FVC databases (Section 2.4.3) and ballprints of newborns
from the Happy Feet database (Section 2.4.4).
2.4.1 Victoria Police pseudo fingermark database
In [2], Kotzerke et al. introduced a pseudo fingermark
database TVP ; it consists of 1428 normal and deliberately
distorted fingermarks from two males and two females.
In order to create the distorted marks, they defined six
different distortion categories. There are 168 marks per
distortion category; the other 420 “normal” marks are not
deliberately distorted. Details are in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 1.
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Table 1 A breakdown of the 1428 marks into the categories of distortion (including no deliberate distortion), and the percentage of
marks found to be EV by each of three experts, with decision on ground truth made by majority vote [3]
Number of Prints of sufficient evidential value
Type of distortion marks taken Assessor 1 (%) Assessor 2 (%) Assessor 3 (%) Ground truth (%) EVA (%)
(i) Light placement 168 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2 54.2
(ii) Smeared 168 3.6 4.2 3.6 3.6 14.9
(iii) Finger twisted lightly 168 4.2 4.8 4.8 4.8 11.3
(iv) Strong twist 168 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0
(v) Heavy placement 168 69.6 65.5 65.5 65.5 64.9
(vi) Partial, heavy placement 168 45.8 48.2 48.2 48.2 50.6
(vii) Normal 420 47.4 49.0 50.0 49.0 50.7
Total 1428 34.1 34.5 34.7 34.5 38.66
The EV distribution for EVA has been calculated for the mobile phone images scaled using CRE Global and the Fusion feature set at the decision threshold corresponding to
the EER
All fingermarks were left on a sheet of paper, brushed
with magnetic black powder then laminated, under super-
vision by a Victoria Police fingerprint expert. All sheets
were digitised with three different capture devices: a
flatbed scanner (scanner); a high-quality camera (DSLR);
and a mobile phone (phone). The capture resolution for
the mobile phone varies as it has been used in an uncon-
strained setup. However, its captures were taken perpen-
dicular to the fingermark sheets and both capturing and
lighting conditions were kept as consistent as possible.
The DSLRwas attached to an operational stand setup usu-
ally used for police work, which led to a lower capture
resolution than 500 ppi. The estimated Global capture
resolutions are 1200 ppi (scanner), 460 ppi (DSLR) and
890 ppi (phone).
All laminated marks have been assessed by three
Victoria Police experts who decided for each mark if it is
of EV by performing at least a partial markup process. The
ground truth is the majority vote of their assessments. Of
the 1428 marks, 492 have ground truth EV. Details appear
in columns 3–6 of Table 1. Further details can be found
in [2].
For this work, we created a reference database RVP of 40
genuine prints against which to match the pseudo finger-
marks. We collected all ten fingerprints of the same four
subjects with a Digital Persona U.are.U 4000 fingerprint
scanner, without any deliberate distortion, to imitate a ref-
erence scenario.We captured the central finger tip area for
consistency with the reference database in Section 2.4.2.
A reference image appears next to its pseudo fingermarks
in Fig. 2.
2.4.2 IIIT-D latent fingerprint database
The IIIT-D latent fingerprint database was introduced
by Sankaran et al. [19]. It consists of 1046 images of
which 1025 contain fingermarks. These marks have been
captured from each finger of 15 subjects under semi-
controlled conditions. The latent marks were dusted using
black powder and captured with a high-quality camera
(Canon EOS 500D) at a resolution of 4752× 3168 px. The
authors captured the marks over the course of multiple
sessions on two different backgrounds (card and tile); the
fingers producing the marks showed different levels of
“dryness, wetness and moisture”. We cropped the images
manually in order to contain only the fingermarks. After
cropping, we rescaled the images to 500 ppi to ensure Ver-
ifinger would recognise them before we separated them
into different test databases according to the background
used: TCIIIT−D (card, 383 images) and TTIIIT−D (tile, 642
images).
The same authors supply IIIT-D Latent Mated 500 ppi
Fingerprint Database [20]. This reference database
RIIIT−D contains one capture for each finger of the 15 sub-
jects from the latent fingerprint database (150 images in
total). They were captured using a Crossmatch L Scan fin-
gerprint scanner. Again, we cropped the images manually
in order to contain only the fingerprints and scaled them
to 500 ppi. Example specimens are shown in Fig. 2.
2.4.3 FVC imposter database
In order to extend the fingerprint reference databases for
our experiments, we set up the imposter database RFVC.
The images were specifically chosen to exhibit alike char-
acteristics (no deliberate distortion) and were all captured
with optical fingerprint scanners. Specifically, we selected
all third prints of FVC2000 DB3 [21] and FVC2004 DB2
[22] and all sixth prints of FVC2002 DB1 [23]. This leads
to a database consisting of 330 imposter prints. We veri-
fied via the cross verification scores that no duplicate of
any imposter is included.
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Fig. 2 Example images of the test databases and their image quality value estimated by EVA. Example images for one subject from each database:
Victoria Police pseudo fingermark database (1a–1f), IIIT-D lifted from a card (2a–2f), IIIT-D lifted from a tile (3a–3f) and Happy Feet (4a–4f). Columns a–e
are specimens taken from the test set and column f is the corresponding reference image. The EV scores q are stated in the bottom left corner of each
individual image. This does not apply to the reference images except for the ballprints where we selected the best of the specimens as reference
2.4.4 Happy Feet
The Happy Feet database [24, 25] is a 2-year longitudinal
footprint and ballprint database from newborn through
infant. It contains captures of both feet and balls (right and
left) for each of the 54 participants in the study “Happy
Feet”, which was funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation to investigate the potential of the footprint
and ballprint as infant biometrics. We limit our experi-
ment to the ballprints of the newborns (who ranged from
the age of 11 to 683 h with an average age of 67 h) because
this is the most challenging set.
Ballprints were captured with an adult single finger-
print scanner, the NEC PU900-10, typically six ballprint
impressions per individual foot. The scanner’s native sen-
sor resolution was 1000 ppi, but its output was down-
sampled in hardware to 500 ppi. There are 589 images in
total.
We split the database into reference set RBP and test
set TBP. The reference set contains the ballprint image
with the highest quality per foot (101 images in total), the
remaining 488 images are in TBP. The quality was esti-
mated by EVA (see Section 2.3). There are fewer than 108
feet because there are no prints available for some of the
newborns due to their uncooperative nature and playful
attitude. Examples of ballprints taken from a newborn are
shown in Fig. 2.
3 Experiments and results
Because we are interested in the possibility of mobile
phone capture of fingermarks in the field, in the last col-
umn of Table 1 is listed the distribution of phone captures
in TVP which have sufficient EV using EVA for the param-
eters giving best EER for phone (Fusion, Global, DA, t =
EER). We observe that they are highly correlated with
the ground truth (correlation coefficient r = 0.995) with
EVA performing a little more conservatively in general,
so that a higher proportion of marks would be passed
by EVA as of EV for further analysis than the experts
will pass. Three types of distortion (smeared, light twist
and strong twist) have very low numbers of marks with
sufficient evidential value assessed by either experts or
EVA.
In Section 3.1, we make a more careful analysis of TVP,
to determine if any marks which can be verified by an
automatic system are not passed either by EVA or experts:
the worst case scenario.
In Section 3.2, we use TVP and its ground truth to
estimate the image quality in a subset T∗VP of higher
evidential value and in the three other ridge-based bio-
metric test sets. We then investigate how the exclusion
of specimens estimated to have lowest quality influ-
ences the retrieval of the correct mate in closed set
identification.
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3.1 Comparing evidential value with automatic
verification score
This experiment aims to investigate the relationship
between a fingermark which can be automatically iden-
tified with high confidence and the evidential value
assigned to it by experts or EVA. The proposed experi-
ment is shown in Fig. 3.
First, we calculate the EV score q for each fingermark
in TVP using the trained and optimised EVA, for the
three feature sets (NFIQ2, Verifinger, Fusion), three CREs
(None, Global, RLAPS) and three capture devices (scan-
ner, DSLR, phone), as described above. For the optimal
Fusion parameter choice, the receiver operating charac-
teristics (ROCs) are given in Fig. 4a–c.
It is clear from Fig. 4a–c that capture resolution can-
not be ignored and must be estimated and allowed for and
that in general the Global estimate performs at least as
well as the RLAPS estimate (it is also faster). With Global
scaling, the distribution of EV across the distortion classes
according to experts, and to EVA as it varies according to
decision threshold, is shown in Fig. 4d–f. This shows that
for all capture devices, the marks labelled as “smeared”,
“twisted lightly” and “strong twist” have markedly lower
EV than the other distortion classes across all deci-
sion thresholds for EVA, in agreement with the ground
truth.
Next, each fingermark image, scaled according to CRE,
is submitted to a verification process performed by
Neurotechnology Verifinger 7.0. For every fingermark, a
verification score for each print in the reference database
RVP ∪ RFVC (containing 370 prints) is computed and
the ccID fingermarks are identified. We use d = 1.5
in Eq. 1. We chose d experimentally, so that it delivers
a compromise between rejecting questionable matches
while retaining clear ones. Verifinger failed to compare
20 query fingermarks to the database because of their
very high image resolution; this was only the case for
(Scanner, None) images. These 20 images were regarded
as incorrectly classified.
Then, we check if the ccID fingermarks are considered
to be of EV by either the experts or EVA. In case of EVA,
Fig. 3 Diagram of the ccID experiment. A fingermark is captured; its
binary evidential value {EV, EV} is estimated by EVA and scaled in the
same way as in EVA. The number of correct and confident
identifications (ccID) of the mark matched to a reference database is
measured w.r.t. the image capture device and EVA parameters [3]
initially, the binary decision threshold t = EER has been
chosen. Table 2 presents our results. For the mobile phone
with Global scaling, correct and confident automatic iden-
tification occurs for 257 marks. Of these, 236 had been
marked as having sufficient EV by experts and 242 by EVA
using the Fusion feature set. A detailed check shows 248
with EV according to either EVA or the experts, with only
6 of the 257 marks having EV according to the experts but
not according to EVA.
Finally, we test the effect of varying the decision thresh-
old t for the EVA scores q. The aim is to observe if
allowing more false positive errors (and hence collect-
ing more marks in a real world scenario) would lead
to a set of marks classified as having EV according to
EVA which is a superset of the experts’ EV set. Results
appear in Fig. 4g–i. We see that while this holds for
scanner and DSLR images, it does not hold for phone
images.
3.2 Thresholding on quality score for identification
For this experiment, all images submitted to EVA are
scaled to 500 ppi using Global scaling if necessary and
their Fusion feature set is extracted because these were
determined in the first experiment to be the best param-
eters overall (see Fig. 1). For classification in EVA,
we used the Victoria Police fingermark database TVP
and its ground truth to train and optimise classifiers.
Each classifier is trained on the scanner images, and
its parameters are chosen via the lowest error at a
fixed false match rate (FMR) for the DSLR and phone
images.
We removed the fingermarks labelled as “smeared”,
“twisted lightly” and “strong twist” from TVP to give the
test set T∗VP because most of them had no evidential value
according to the experts (see Table 1).
For T∗VP, the trained classifier is DA optimised
at FMR100, and for the other three test sets, the
trained classifier is k-NN optimised at FMR5. We
made these choices experimentally. For each test set
T ∈ {T∗VP,TCIIIT−D,TTIIIT−D,TBP}, the trained classi-
fier is applied to each image’s feature set and its EV
score q ∈[ 0, 1] is obtained. For T∗VP, we restrict to
the scanner images. Now, each image in a test set ∈
T has a quality value q. Basic statistics for the qual-
ity value distributions appear in Table 3. All test sets
have similar image quality on average, with the excep-
tion of TTIIIT−D (IIIT-D, marks lifted off a tile), which is
lower.
We compare a query image (∈ T) against the cor-
responding reference set R ∈ {RVP ∪ RFVC,RIIIT−D ∪
RFVC,RBP} and sort the resulting match scores from high
to low. This is the retrieval order. The actual rank is
the position at which the corresponding print (∈ R) is
found.
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Fig. 4 ROCs (a–c), EV distribution according to EVA and experts (d–f) and ccID results (g–i). All results are for the Fusion feature set. The first row
(a–c) shows the top left corner of the receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) for all capture devices. The colour varies according to the fraction of
EV and ccID/ccID as the classification threshold moves along the ROC; the smaller the fraction, the lighter the colour (only applicable to “Scanner, None”
and “Phone, None”; the fraction equals 1 across the whole range in all other cases). With Global scaling, the second row (d–f) shows the EV
distribution according to the mark’s distortion class, as computed by EVA (solid) and the experts (dashed). The latter is unaffected by the decision
threshold and remains constant. The third row (g–i) shows the number of ccID marks classified as EV by EVA (light colour), any additional ones by the
experts (dark colour) and those not classified as EV by either (white). The gray line is the threshold corresponding to the EER when the operating
point moves along the ROC
Finally, for each T , we threshold on quality value t to
create a reduced test set T(t) of increasingly higher qual-
ity specimens and recompute retrieval order and rank.
We calculate the percentage of all query images that
have retrieved their mate within rank k w.r.t. the quality
threshold t. The results are shown in Fig. 5 and are sum-
marised in Table 4. The correct retrieval rate at rank k
improves across all databases if low-quality specimens, as
determined by EVA, are removed.
4 Conclusions
The first experiment shows a strong correlation between
the EV score output by EVA and if a particular fingermark
can be confidently identified by a commercial matcher
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Table 2 Number of fingermarks which have been correctly and
with confidence identified (ccID) and the number of ccID marks
which have been classified by experts or EVA to be of sufficient
EV w.r.t. capture device (Scanner, DSLR, Phone), CRE Global and
feature set (NFIQ2, Verifinger, Fusion) if applicable
Capture device
CRE Scanner DSLR Phone
ccID None 1 244 10
Global 286 240 257
RLAPS 115 122 119
Experts Global 263 228 236
EVANFIQ2 Global 268 228 246
EVAVerifinger 269 224 242
EVAFusion 273 232 242
EVA uses the threshold corresponding to the EER. The EV results for the CREs None
and RLAPS are not reported separately due to their much smaller numbers
compared to Global (see the ccID rows above)
(see Fig. 4). This is partially due to the setup used because
both the matching score computation and EV estimation
are based on image features.
Further limitations of the matching system used became
evident and confirm the findings in [2]. Verifinger is very
resolution dependent and requires marks or prints to
be in a very narrow capture resolution window (around
500 ppi) with as little variation as possible to perform
properly. This is the reason that a Global scaling factor
and the DSLR images without any scaling work well. It
also explains why there are very few ccIDs when images
with very high resolution without (CRE None) or with
individual (CRE RLAPS) scaling are used. Nevertheless,
the image quality due to the use of different capture
devices is not a major drawback. The phone performs
more strongly than the DSLR but falls shy of the scanner,
under the condition that the capture resolution is adjusted
properly.
Table 1 indicates that EVA works rather conserva-
tively and tends to flag a fingermark as being of suffi-
cient evidential value slightly more often than an expert
who applies other considerations (such as court eligibil-
ity or relevance) than just image quality. Nevertheless, an
expert’s accuracy and repeatability regarding borderline
decisions can vary, mostly due to the print quality [9, 10].
We note there are ccID marks which have no sufficient
evidential value according to the experts’ assessment. This
might be again due to experimental setup that heavily
favours image processing algorithms or to the limited size
of the test population and database. Some of the ccID
fingermarks are only considered to be of evidential value
by the experts or EVA, but not both. For instance, in
Table 2, the 21 out of 257 ccID fingermarks not passed
by the experts, and the 15 missed by EVA, may not have
evidential value but they do represent a loss of criminal
intelligence if they were not collected. Encouragingly, only
6 marks have EV according to the experts but not accord-
ing to EVA. However, for phone images, there is no false
acceptance rate for EVA at which criminal intelligence is
not lost, since there are always marks passed by experts
but not by EVA (Fig. 4i).
The difference between the image feature sets extracted
is rather small but should be considered in a real-world
framework.
The second experiment shows, perhaps surprisingly,
that EVA can be used to estimate the EV and infer the
image quality for specimens taken from other databases,
even if they are from a different ridge-based biometric.
Furthermore, it seems that TCIIIT−D (IIIT-D, marks lifted
off a card) contains marks which are less distinctive
and more challenging to match successfully. Interestingly
enough, TTIIIT−D seems to perform worse than TCIIIT−D
when the entire test set is used and no specimens are
excluded but the situation reverses when the specimens
with the worst quality as determined by EVA are excluded.
The correct retrieval rates at rank k for ballprints seem
low when compared to the other test sets which exhibit
similar image quality statistics. Reasons are that the dis-
tinctiveness of a newborn’s ballprint suffers from the small
and fragile ridge-lines which are incredibly difficult to
capture properly [25, 26]. Secondly, the playful or unco-
operative nature of the child increases the difficulty to
capture the same area of the ball reliably. This leads to
prints which have only a small area in common and hence
are difficult to match correctly. Nevertheless, the rank
1 retrieval rate of about 17 % is comparable with other
newborn studies [25].
Table 3 Image quality value distribution (mean, standard deviation, first and third quartile) for the different image sets as inferred by
EVA
TVP T∗VP TCIIIT−D TTIIIT−D RBP ∪ TBP TBP
Mean ±SD 0.32 ± 0.41 0.48 ± 0.43 0.49 ± 0.32 0.39 ± 0.32 0.48 ± 0.12 0.46 ± 0.10
Q1 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.41 0.39
Q3 0.82 0.97 0.79 0.76 0.55 0.53
For TVP and T∗VP, only the scanned images are used
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Fig. 5 Retrieval of the correct mate within rank k. Results for the retrieval of the correct mate within rank k for different databases when one thresholds
on the quality score for identification. The legends indicate the percentage of images removed from the test set. aT∗VP, bTCIIIT−D, cTTIIIT−D, and dTBP
The EVA shows similar behaviour on all databases, even
for newborn ballprints, for which the algorithm has been
neither trained nor optimised, and which suffer from
severe quality issues due to small and fragile ridges, and
the uncooperative nature of the newborn. This empha-
sises the algorithm’s robustness.
We have shown that there is a strong correlation
between the fact that a fingermark can be automat-
ically identified with confidence and its EVA-inferred
evidential value. We gain confidence that EVA could
be used as a pre-filter for submitting marks to sys-
tems such as IAFIS for matching. Since EVA is
trained on expert decisions, the correlation of EV score
q with expert decisions means EVA is a candidate
for objectively flagging difficult latents (with low q)
before or in parallel with forensic examiner analysis.
This would have procedural consequences for forensic
services.
Table 4 Percentage of mates retrieved within rank k for various databases from the corresponding reference database
T∗VP TCIIIT−D TTIIIT−D TBP
Rank 1 44.05 %(@0 %) 52.74 %(@0 %) 43.61 %(@0 %) 13.52 %(@0 %)
Rank 5 62.55 %(@0 %) 55.61 %(@0 %) 47.98 %(@0 %) 21.11 %(@0 %)
Rank 10 74.57 %(@0 %) 57.96 %(@0 %) 50.47 %(@0 %) 29.30 %(@0 %)
Rank 20 87.66 %(@0 %) 60.31 %(@0 %) 52.65 %(@0 %) 41.19 %(@0 %)
Rank 1 71.00 %(@50 %) 62.35 %(@33 %) 64.17 %(@50 %) 17.27 %(@49 %)
Rank 5 82.90 %(@50 %) 65.52 %(@47 %) 66.87 %(@50 %) 23.29 %(@49 %)
Rank 10 89.46 %(@50 %) 66.67 %(@38 %) 68.42 %(@50 %) 29.72 %(@49 %)
Rank 20 94.19 %(@50 %) 68.97 %(@47 %) 69.66 %(@50 %) 42.50 %(@43 %)
The upper half of the table indicates the results without the removal of low-quality specimens; the lower half states the highest retrieval rate when up to 50% of the images
are removed based on their quality estimated by EVA
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Our findings also indicate that it is feasible to use an
automatic mobile phone EVA application to determine if a
fingermark at a crime scene is of sufficient evidential value
and could be collected by non-experts. In the case that
the capture conditions are unknown, it is sensible to use a
capture resolution estimator to improve performance.
Furthermore, our results suggest that EVA can be
applied to other ridge-based biometrics such as ballprint
to derive a specimen’s image quality despite being trained
and optimised on fingermarks. This underlines the algo-
rithm’s robustness.
In the future, we would like to perform more exhaus-
tive testing of EVA on additional and considerably larger
databases andwith differentmatching systems. Also, a fin-
germark determined to be of EV needs to be evaluated as
either VEO or VID. Eventually, we would like to test per-
formance in the field and apply EVA there, even to marks
of other ridge-based biometrics.
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